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This response should come as no sur-
prise. Measures against money laundering
have increasingly become an important
front in the fight against crime. Such mea-
sures can facilitate detection of financial
trails that provide important sources of ev-
idence, potentially linking the members of
a criminal organization and leading to
convictions of the ring leaders—who are
hard to connect to the day-to-day criminal
operations. Moreover, finding and seizing
money or assets that result from criminal
activity can also serve to take the motive
out of crime. And, in the case of terrorist
financing, it can make it more difficult to
commit future acts. 
Even before September 11, banks and
other financial and nonfinancial institu-
tions in the United States had been re-
quired to keep increasingly detailed records of financial trans-
actions and report suspicious dealings. International organi-
zations have worked on designing common standards to fight
money laundering and have begun to pressure countries with
lax regulations to adopt stricter laws. 
Anti-money laundering policies promise to become even
more stringent in the aftermath of September 11. The U.S. Con-
gress passed the USA PATRIOT Act, which expanded anti-
money laundering provisions. It will affect a broad range of
companies, such as securities brokers and dealers, commodity
firms, and investment companies. It also imposes more exact-
ing requirements for U.S. financial institutions dealing with for-
eign customers and institutions, and provides for greater scruti-
ny to open new accounts at U.S. financial institutions. Many
foreign countries are following suit.
But, fighting money laundering is no easy task. With in-
creasing globalization and advances in banking technologies,
moving money around the world has become easier and, with
the growth in international capital flows, it has also become eas-
ier to mask illegitimate monies in the stream of legitimate trans-
fers. Even as nations such as Switzerland and the Cayman Is-
lands have begun to restrict their coveted bank secrecy regimes,
nations with underregulated financial systems, such as the Pa-
cific island nation of Nauru, have emerged as centers of im-
portance in the realm of global finance.
Similarly, as new domestic laws have made money launder-
ing more difficult in particular areas of the financial system,
criminals have sought new ways to disguise their loot. And,
when it comes to terrorism finance, authorities have to think
very differently about the issue. Instead of looking for dirty
money in the process of being cleansed, they now also have to
detect funds that may have legitimate origins but are destined
for criminal ends. 
MONEY LAUNDERING 101
Criminals have always tried to hide their money. The greater
the amount illegally earned, the more difficult it becomes to
camouflage its origins and enjoy the proceeds of crime. Sud-
den, inexplicable wealth can draw the attention of authorities.
And, ever since Al Capone was put behind bars for tax eva-
sion, criminals have known that handling and using the spoils
of their endeavors can be one of their weakest links. 
The practice of disguising wealth, whether legitimate or il-
legitimate, from government attention has a long history. More
than 3,000 years ago, merchants in China protected their wealth
from government confiscation using some of the same schemes
in use today: converting money to movable assets; moving cash
outside a jurisdiction to invest in a business; and trading at in-
flated prices to expatriate funds, according to a study cited by
money laundering expert Nigel Morris-Cotterrill.
Today, nobody knows for sure how much money is laun-
dered globally. It is difficult to know if money is being count-
ed more than once as it cycles through the system and harder
still to know how much goes undetected. Nonetheless, experts
believe the amounts are large. The most cited figure is between
2 and 5 percent of global GDP—or between $600 billion to $1.5
trillion per year. Still, this is an admittedly rough estimate based
on extrapolations of the global sales of illegal drugs on the low-
er bound, and estimates of the size of underground economies
on the upper bound.
To disguise the unlawful nature of funds, criminals must go
through a process that varies from crime to crime but that gen-erally involves three separate stages. First, cash must be con-
verted into a more portable and less suspicious form—some-
times achieved by using cashier’s checks or money orders—and
then it is entered into the financial system. Once there, it goes
through a series of transactions that resemble legitimate activ-
ity and often involve crossing several national borders, making
it more difficult for law enforcement agencies to
follow the trail. Finally, the funds must be inte-
grated into the legitimate financial system. 
Of course, not every criminal act calls for the
profits to be laundered. Petty criminals can get
away with working in cash. But bigger criminals
have to resort to increasingly elaborate methods
to create the illusion of legitimate wealth. 
Take, for example, the drug trade. Illegal drug
trafficking is believed to be the largest source for
laundering in the United States and accounts for
60 to 80 percent of all federal money laundering
prosecutions, according to James Richards, au-
thor of Transnational Criminal Organizations,
Cybercrime, and Money Laundering. Just the
bulkiness of drug money creates logistical prob-
lems. Justice Depart-
ment officials have es-
timated that the weight
of cash generated by
drug sales is about ten
times that of the drug
itself for heroin and six
times for cocaine.
While traffickers only
need to smuggle and
distribute about 22
pounds of heroin to net $1 million, they then have
to contend with 220 pounds of street cash.
Not surprisingly, the assets of drug traffick-
ers and other criminals who produce vast vol-
umes of cash are believed to be most vulnerable
to detection at the stage of placing cash into the
financial system. Thus, they often try to avoid
triggering the mandatory reporting requirements
of large cash transactions by U.S. banks, or steer
clear of U.S. financial institutions altogether.
Bulk cash smuggling across international bor-
ders is perhaps the most widespread way of do-
ing this. Smuggling is done in a variety of ways,
from employing an army of couriers who phys-
ically transport loads of concealed cash to using
trucks and containers. 
Once the dollars leave the United States, they
can be placed in banks in countries that have weaker controls.
Or, cash can simply be brought back into the United States,
points out Richards. In this scheme, cash smuggled out of the
country is brought back in, this time declared at the border sup-
ported by false invoices and receipts. As the funds are recog-
nized by U.S. Customs, they can be deposited at any U.S. bank
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MANY FIRMS ARE NOW REQUIRED TO REPORT
ON SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITIES BY THEIR CLIENTS 
THE BLACK MARKET PESO EXCHANGE
Perhaps the largest money laundering system in the United States is the
Colombian Black Market Peso Exchange, estimated to launder at least $5 billion
a year in drug proceeds. The network has existed for decades as a way to avoid
Colombian currency controls and tax laws. Drug traffickers turned to it in order
to convert the dollars earned from drug sales in the United States into pesos
back home. They sell their dollar proceeds for pesos to brokers who take on the
task and the risk of cleaning the money. 
The brokers take the dollars at exchange rates usually between 20 and 40
percent below the official Colombian exchange rate. They place the cash in U.S.
banks by smurfing or other schemes (see page 18). Then, they sell the dollars
in Colombia to importers or businessmen and use the pesos to pay the traffick-
ers in their home turf. The dollars deposited in U.S. banks are wired to personal
accounts or used to pay legitimate companies for goods, as Colombian
importers often buy American appliances, electronics, car
parts, and cigarettes to be smuggled into and sold in Colombia. 
In an attempt to disrupt this arrangement, Colombian and
U.S. authorities have begun to work with the firms that take
the end payments. In summer of 2000, at the request of the
U.S. government, Panamanian authorities seized a Bell model
407 helicopter purchased by a Colombian individual from Bell
Helicopter Textron, of Fort Worth, Texas. The government also
froze payments in the company’s bank account, alleging the
money was linked to laundering of drug proceeds. The evi-
dence: Bell had received as payment 31 separate wire transfers
from individuals and companies with no known relationship to the purchaser of
the $1.5 million helicopter. For its part, Bell contended that it did not know that
drugs were the source of the funds and that, in its view, it had complied with
U.S. laws. 
The U.S. government has campaigned to educate U.S. manufacturers and
distributors about the forfeiture and indictment they can face if they are caught
knowingly participating in the black market scheme. The Colombian government
has also been pressuring U.S. companies to look more closely at customers.
In 2000, Colombian states went so far as to sue Philip Morris, alleging that its
products are frequently smuggled into Columbia as part of the black market
exchange, costing the government dearly in lost tax revenues—Colombian
police estimate that only 4 percent of Marlboros consumed in the country got
there legally, according to Newsweek. But companies seeking to comply may
face additional costs. General Electric told Frontline that, as a result of stricter
controls, including not allowing distributors to export out of the country, sales
to South Florida decreased by about 25 percent between 1995 and 1999.
Smuggler caught with
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without raising red flags. There is some
evidence this technique is widespread:
Brownsville, Texas, and Nogales, Arizona,
had the most funds declared upon entry
into the United States from the Mexican
border—$8 billion and $5 billion, respec-
tively, between 1988 and 1990—amounts
much higher than would be justified by
their population or flow of commerce, ac-
cording to the Financial Crimes Enforce-
ment Network of the U.S. Treasury De-
partment (FinCEN), as cited by Richards.
Launderers have also sought ways to
use the U.S. financial system without rais-
ing suspicion. Some criminals break down
the cash earned into many smaller wads for
deposit. This technique came to be called
“smurfing” by law enforcement officials in
Florida after the little blue cartoon char-
acters. In this method, many people—the smurfs—make large
numbers of deposits, always below $10,000, at several differ-
ent institutions on a daily basis, thus avoiding triggering U.S.
bank reporting regulations. (See box on the Colombian Black
Market Peso Exchange on page 17.)
Front companies are another common way of placing cash in
the system. By running cash-intensive businesses, such as
restaurants or liquor stores, launderers can blend legal and il-
legal profits and make large cash deposits into banks without
eliciting questions. In addition, criminals may look beyond
banks to businesses such as foreign exchange bureaus, money
remittance businesses, and check cashers to convert cash into
easier-to-handle instruments or to send the funds abroad.
And, there is also the option of using underground banking
structures such as Hawala. Hawala is an old system that orig-
inated in South Asia but now operates in many countries. Such
informal financial networks are very attractive to those seeking
to transfer money without government notice because the trans-
actions leave no paper trail. A person who wants to send mon-
ey abroad takes the cash to an underground banker who gives
him a marker or some form of receipt. The broker in turn, in-
forms his contacts in the transfer’s destination so that the des-
ignated receiver can claim the money at the other end, minus a
commission. The money does not physically need to be trans-
ported abroad, as two-way flows support the exchange: Cash
for the payment is provided by customers wanting to send mon-
ey in the opposite direction. 
A WORLD OF OPPORTUNITIES
Once the money is placed in the financial system somewhere
in the world, technology and globalization facilitate the process
of disguising the origin of the funds and reintegrating them into
the realm of legitimate finance. Wire transfers, for instance, of-
fer launderers the possibility of quickly moving money through
different accounts and different countries until it becomes im-
possible to trace the origin of the funds. One of the most re-
cent trends, according to the U.S. Treasury, involves funds
wired to or through a U.S. financial institution—primarily from
Switzerland, Italy, Germany, and England—and then with-
drawn in any one of about 57 nations through an automated
teller machine (ATM). The largest number of this type of ATM
withdrawals is made in Colombia. 
Another way in which funds deposited abroad can be repa-
triated and given a semblance of respectability is through loans.
Illicit funds deposited in foreign banks can be used as collater-
al for loans drawn for legitimate investments elsewhere. 
Furthermore, criminals have increasingly resorted to prod-
ucts and services in so-called offshore banking havens such as
Nauru. These jurisdictions tend to offer a certain level of bank-
ing or commercial secrecy, low or no tax rates, and relatively
simple requirements for licensing and regulating banks and oth-
er businesses. Money launderers often take advantage of laws
that favor easy incorporation and the use of nominee owners
or bearer shares—which allow anonymous ownership of com-
panies. Such laws allow them to create “shell” companies that
do not conduct any commercial or manufacturing business and
whose sole purpose is to serve as conduits for fund flows. 
Whatever the “cleansing” method, the transactions involved
are usually extremely complicated—and deliberately so. In the
investigation of alleged money laundering by Raul Salinas (the
brother of the former Mexican president), for instance, the U.S.
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was able to transfer between $90 million and $100 million be-
tween 1992 and 1994 from Mexico to London and Switzerland
through a private banking account with Citibank in New York.
Key in enabling him to do this was a private investment com-
pany in the Cayman Islands named Trocca, which was formed
by Cititrust (Cayman), then an affiliate of Citicorp—now
known as Citigroup—to hold Mr. Salinas’s assets. The laws
in the Cayman Islands protected the confidentiality of the doc-
umentation linking Mr. Salinas to Trocca. To further insulate
Mr. Salinas’s connection to Trocca, “Cititrust (Cayman) used
three additional shell companies to function as Trocca’s board
of directors—Madeleine Investments SA, Donat Investments
SA, and Hitchcock Investments SA,” states the GAO report.
In addition, many of the fund transfers from Mexico to New
York were made by Mr. Salinas’s wife using her maiden name.
The whole affair was only discovered after Mr. Salinas was ar-
rested and charged with murder in 1995. (In 1999, Raul Sali-
nas was sentenced to 50 years in prison in Mexico on charges
of planning the 1994 murder of Jose Francisco Ruiz Massieu,
his former brother-in-law and a leader of the Institutional Rev-
olutionary Party.)
THE CAT-AND-MOUSE GAME
In spite of money laundering’s long history and broad impact,
laws against the practice are relatively recent in the United
States—and even more so in other countries. Money launder-
ing was not considered a federal crime in the United States un-
til the mid 1980s. The term itself first appeared in print in the
early 1970s in the context of the Watergate scandal, when it was
used to describe a process to circumvent a law prohibiting
anonymous campaign contributions, according to Jeffrey
Robinson, author of The Laundrymen: Inside Money Laun-
dering, the World’s Third-Largest Business. Members of Nixon’s
Committee to Reelect the President used a contact who re-
ceived donations in Mexico and then forwarded them to
Bernard L. Barker, a real estate salesman in Miami, to protect
the identity of the private citizens that made the donations.
When Barker was arrested for breaking into the Democratic
National Committee headquarters in the Watergate building,
the money trail helped link the Watergate break-in back to
Nixon.
The growth of the illegal drug trade—with the vast illicit for-
tunes it generated—was the main factor motivating the evolu-
tion of anti-money laundering legislation in the United States
and Europe. Reports of people depositing bags of currency of
doubtful origin into banks led Congress to pass the Bank Se-
crecy Act (BSA) in 1970—the backbone of domestic money
laundering legislation. Though it did not make laundering a
criminal activity, the Act required financial institutions to cre-
ate and preserve a paper trail for various financial transactions
in order to facilitate criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations.
As a result, financial institutions have to file reports for most
cash transactions over $10,000 and keep such records for five
years; and individuals have to report whenever they physical-
ly carry more than $10,000 in monetary instruments (coins, cur-
rency, travelers’ checks, bearer bonds, securities, and negotiable
instruments) into or out of the United States. 
But criminals would not be deterred and money laundering
methods evolved to circumvent these new restrictions. As laun-
derers developed new methods, new laws and more stringent
punishments were crafted to cover the regulatory gaps. As it be-
came more difficult to make large cash deposits in banks, for
instance, criminals found other businesses that served their
needs such as check cashers or money remitters. In response,
the currency reporting requirement of the Act was expanded
to cover check cashers, currency exchange businesses, casinos,
the U.S. Postal Service, and businesses that issue, sell, or re-
deem traveler’s checks, among others. Nonetheless, the re-
porting requirement was “widely disregarded until 1985,” writes
Robinson. That year, Bank of Boston was fined $500,000 for
not reporting 1,163 transactions valued at $1.2 billion. 
In order to further strengthen the fight against dirty money,
Congress made money laundering a crime in its own right with
the passage of the 1986 Money Laundering Control Act
(MLCA). The legislation made money laundering punishable
by up to 20 years in prison, provided for both civil and crimi-
nal forfeitures of funds, and made it illegal to break down fi-
nancial transactions to avoid triggering currency transaction re-
ports. 
The MLCA defined money laundering fairly broadly. Fi-
nancial transactions that ordinarily would not be considered
illegal became criminal if they knowingly involved the proceeds
of a “specified unlawful activity.” These activities comprise a
long, and expanding, list of over 200 criminal offenses includ-
ing such diverse items as health care fraud, counterfeiting, drug
trafficking, espionage, extortion, murder, and—since 1996—
terrorism. (Interestingly, tax evasion is not currently part of the
list. So, for instance, a doctor not reporting all his income and
sending what he doesn’t report to an offshore bank would not
be considered to be laundering money unless the money was il-
legally earned. The Internal Revenue Service recently estimat-
ed that as many as one to two million Americans may be evad-
ing taxes by secretly depositing money in tax havens like the
Cayman Islands and withdrawing it using American Express,
MasterCard, and Visa cards.)
Specifically, the MLCA made it a crime to knowingly con-
duct transactions above $10,000 with property derived from a
specified crime. For lower amounts, transactions are illegal if
they are intended to conceal the origin of the funds, avoid re-
porting requirements, or conceal illegal proceeds from tax au-
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thorities. For any amount, it is also con-
sidered money laundering when a mone-
tary transaction into or out of the United
States is being carried out with the intent
to facilitate a future crime from the speci-
fied list. So, in the case of terrorism, even
if the funds originated in a “legitimate” do-
nation, their transportation, transfer, or
transmission is considered money laun-
dering if they are used to support a crimi-
nal cause. 
In addition to the passage of the
MLCA, the reporting requirements im-
posed by the Banking Secrecy Act have
been expanded. The Annunzio-Wylie
Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1992
made it mandatory for financial institu-
tions to report anysuspicious transactions
relevant to possible violations of the law
by their clients. As of January 2002, this also included money
service businesses, such as issuers of money orders and travel-
er checks. The law explicitly prohibited banks from informing
their customers when they have filed a suspicious activity re-
port. And, it protected banks from civil liability for doing so, by
furnishing them with certain “safe harbor” provisions. 
Though domestic laws have become increasingly strict, their
effectiveness has been limited to the extent that other countries’
laws are lax. Just as money laundering techniques spread from
banks to other firms in the attempt to circumvent regulation,
money laundering activity spread to other countries where the
laws were weaker. In fact, some nations developed a large in-
dustry based on laws that benefited financial secrecy and dis-
couraged international law enforcement cooperation. The tiny
Pacific island of Nauru, which sits halfway between Hawaii and
Australia with a population of merely 12,000, for instance, al-
lowed people to set up banks for as little as $25,000 without even
setting foot on the island. The nation has been accused of fa-
cilitating the laundering of $70 billion in Russian Mafia mon-
ey through almost 450 banks based there (all registered to the
same government post office box).
At issue are not just small nations looking to make quick
wealth. There are also international differences in how coun-
tries define money laundering and the crimes they accept as un-
derlying unlawful activities. Countries tended to consider only
those crimes that had the most pernicious effects on their own
soil. The United States, for example, included foreign drug traf-
ficking as an underlying offense, but foreign corruption was not
on the list until the USA PATRIOT Act was passed. 
Resolving these differences requires international coopera-
tion. From the IMF to the United Nations, several international
organizations have taken initiatives against money laundering.
Chief among them, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF),
created in 1989 by the G-7 (the group of the world’s largest in-
dustrialized nations, including the United States), which has
worked to establish international standards against money laun-
dering. Most recently, the strategy of the FATF members shift-
ed towards a more active role. The organization has named 19
“noncooperative” jurisdictions hoping that increased interna-
tional scrutiny would pressure them to make their anti-money
laundering laws and enforcement practices stronger. In De-
cember of 2001, FATF imposed countermeasures on Nauru,
deeming that it had not adequately addressed the legal defi-
ciencies in its offshore banking sector. 
COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES
The fight against money laundering has not been uncontro-
versial. Like all legislation, money laundering laws have to play
a delicate balance between the costs to businesses and indi-
vidual citizens with the benefits of legislation. To some critics,
the reporting requirements impose high costs on banks and oth-
er financial institutions. Though numbers are unreliable, as pro-
cedures vary somewhat by institution, the U.S. Treasury’s Fi-
nancial Crimes Enforcement Network estimated in 1999 that it
costs financial institutions $109 million a year to comply with
the reporting and record-keeping requirements of the Bank-
ing Secrecy Act. But whether these costs are high depends on
our estimate of the costs crime and laundering impose on soci-
ety, and on the law’s effectiveness in combating them. 
The legal definition of money laundering and the penalties
imposed by the law have also raised some questions. For in-
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inals, such as drug traffickers, a difficult issue for lawyers. An
attorney who receives over $10,000 in fees can be accused of
money laundering, given that it would be difficult to prove ig-
norance of the potentially tainted origin of the funds. Precise-
ly because of their problematic nature, prosecutions of this type
are rare and have to be approved by the Justice Department. 
In addition, the criminal penalties for money laundering drew
fire because they were often higher than for other white-collar
crimes such that defendants received higher sentences than if
charged only with the underlying criminal offense. In response
to the criticisms, the sentencing guidelines for money launder-
ing were revised this past November to make punishments
more sensitive to the seriousness of the underlying crimes.
But perhaps the most controversial aspect has been the effect
that money laundering laws have on privacy and how they af-
fect business-client relationships. The fact that financial insti-
tutions and other businesses are obligated to report suspicious
transactions to the government changes the nature of their re-
lationship with their clients. It places some businesses that tra-
ditionally served clients in confidence partly on the side of en-
forcement. Moreover, in some cases, it requires that businesses
ask more questions of their clients. In order to be
able to report suspicious transactions, financial
institutions have to make sure they know their
customers well. They are expected to conduct a
risk assessment and determine the appropriate
level of due diligence. In some instances, this
might include verifying a customer’s identity, de-
termining their sources of wealth, reviewing their
credit and character, and understanding the type
of transactions the customer would typically
conduct. 
For banks, which were subject to these regu-
lations well before September 11, the key issue
is to make sure they tell customers about what
they do and why they do it, says John Byrne, Se-
nior Federal Counsel and Compliance Manag-
er at the American Bankers Association. “You
want to be able to explain to your consumer: We
don’t share or sell your information or, we do, if
you allow it,” says Byrne. Banks also have to
make clear that, if they ask clients for informa-
tion, they do so to “protect the institution, to pro-
tect the country, and to protect the client.”
Some European countries and Canada have
imposed suspicious activity reporting that goes
well beyond the financial sector—requiring at-
torneys to report on suspicious transactions by
clients. This February, the American Bar Asso-
ciation issued a statement urging the govern-
ment to protect the principle of lawyer-client confidentiality in
its fight against money laundering. Other countries have adopt-
ed laws or policies that make lawyers “the eyes and ears of the
government,” Washington, D.C., lawyer Stephen Saltzburg
told the media. “This is the single most alarming threat to the
attorney-client privilege that anyone has seen in a long time,”
Saltzburg said.
In the future, balancing our concerns for privacy with the
need to prevent crime and terrorism will continue to be one of
the most difficult issues in dealing with money laundering. As
the evolution of money laundering legislation shows, increased
efforts and widened scope are certain to make money launder-
ing more difficult. But, they are not likely to end it. So long as
crime exists, the fight against money laundering is likely to con-
tinue to be a cat-and-mouse game with new methods and loop-
holes being discovered as soon as prior regulatory gaps are
closed. In this context, money laundering laws and awareness
of the issue help prevent innocent citizens and organizations
from being corrupted by easy money or from becoming unwit-
ting accomplices to crime. The alternative is to turn a blind eye
and let corruption flourish. S
PREVENTING CRIME WHILE PROTECTING PRIVACY
REQUIRES AN INCREASINGLY DELICATE BALANCE 
CORRUPTING POWER
Law enforcement and financial authorities have focused on money laundering,
in part, as a way of combating crimes ranging from drug and arms trafficking
to terrorism, fraud, and embezzlement. But, beyond serving as an enforcement
tool to combat other crimes, large-scale money laundering poses problems in
and of itself. As criminals try to find ways to legitimize large amounts of money,
this creates the potential for corrupting government officials and financial insti-
tutions. And, even if money laundering does not corrupt the whole institution,
banks can see their reputations tarnished and the public’s trust in them eroded
if they are embroiled in a money laundering scandal. 
There can also be macroeconomic consequences. “Money laundering allo-
cates dirty money around the world not so much on the basis of expected rates
of return but on the basis of ease of avoiding national controls,” says
International Monetary Fund economist Vito Tanzi. Thus, money is not used
where it is most productive. Moreover, though there are no clear examples of
this so far, large and sudden movements of dirty money—say, responding to
changes in legislation or law enforcement—could lead to instability in particular
countries or banking systems. 
In addition, money laundering can end up undermining the legitimate pri-
vate sector; front companies used to hide ill-gotten gains may offer their ser-
vices at discounted prices, crowding out legitimate businesses. Hotels and
restaurants built to serve as cover for illicit cash may be created in tourist mar-
kets that are already saturated. In Colombia, large-scale smuggling of electronic
appliances, cigarettes, and other goods is one way in which drug proceeds are
introduced into the country. These items are sold at very discounted prices,
weakening the domestic manufacturing industry.